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The use of unified communication; video conferencing, audio conferencing, and instant messaging has
skyrocketed during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, security and privacy considerations have often been
neglected. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of security and privacy in Unified Communication
(UC). We systematically analyze security and privacy threats and mitigations in a generic UC scenario. Based
on this, we analyze security and privacy features of the major UC market leaders and we draw conclusions
on the overall UC landscape. While confidentiality in communication channels is generally well protected
through encryption, other privacy properties are mostly lacking on UC platforms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In April 2020, the Zoom video conferencing platform reached over 300 million daily meeting
participants, compared to 10 million in December 2019. Similarly, Microsoft Teams reached 200
million daily meeting participants in April 2020, during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.
These examples emphasize the extent to which video conferencing is now used, to stay in contact
with friends, family and colleagues [154, 169].
The term Unified Communication (UC)1 has evolved over time with changes in technologies,
market trends, and user requirements. UC started in the 1980s with the trend of replacing circuit-
switched telephone systems, provided by telephone companies with private branch exchange (PBX),
with in-house telephone systems. In a further step, PBXs were replaced by Voice over IP (VoIP)
systems and later moved to a software architecture instead of purpose-built hardware components
by using existing IP (Internet Protocol) networks with greater flexibility and cost-saving. Over
time these software-based voice systems merged and integrated with other systems such as e-mail
clients, presence information, and Instant Messaging (IM). The wide deployment and availability of
mobile devices and smartphones introduced additional challenges into UC environments, including
1There are variations of the term UC including Unified Communications and Collaboration (UCC), Unified Communication
& Conferencing, and many more, but from a technology viewpoint the differences are minor.
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extended user communication options with additional operating systems and challenges related
to mobile networks with jitter, packet loss, and bandwidth limits. In recent years, the hosted
and cloud-based UC architectures such as UC as a Service (UCaaS) and web-based conferencing
gained popularity, in similarity to other IT areas that operate architectures “in the cloud” instead of
on-premises.
Motivation. Early idealist users of the Internet saw it as a technology that would support liberty
and democracy. The Arab Spring in the early 2010s is one example of the importance of social
media and other internet-based technologies’ involvement in political changes. Internet and mobile
technologies were shown to support communication, association, and organization, with govern-
ments a step behind in discovering and interfering with such communications. The use of such
technologies is not limited to periods of intense political change; journalists, human rights activists,
political activists, and minority groups are also likely to make use of these technologies. Popular
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp are used frequently by these
social groups, but may not be designed to meet their requirements, for example with regard to
encryption and anonymity.
Security and privacy features are often not the main focus for providers of UC platforms. Many
platforms rely on closed-source code and their services are only accessible via public clouds. As
a result, users cannot, for example, verify the implementation of end-to-end encryption and key
management, but instead need to trust the claims made by the platform provider [109, 154, 169].
Contributions. Many surveys of Unified Communication (UC) focus on comparing functionality,
for example minimum video resolution, telephony dial-in support, integration capabilities with
other systems (interoperability), recording of meetings, desktop sharing, or meeting controls
[19, 150]. Other surveys focus on the jurisdiction, terms of use, and GDPR (General Data Protection
Regulation) compliance of UC architectures [12, 32, 33]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no systematic analysis of UC security and privacy issues that discusses requirements,
threats, and mitigations. This paper closes this gap by presenting a scientific survey of security and
privacy features of widely used and known UC architectures. In particular, this paper makes the
following contributions:
(1) We provide an introduction to UC based on a generic UC architecture and give a detailed
description of its elements.
(2) We conduct a systematic privacy and security analysis of this generic architecture, following
the STRIDE and LINDDUN methodology, to uncover the security and privacy risks in UC
systems and known mitigations for them.
(3) We analyze ten major UC platforms, comparing their features against the identified privacy
and security risks and mitigations.
(4) We draw conclusions about the major remaining threats in individual systems as well as in
the sector as a whole, and outline directions for future research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces UC and the generic
architecture. The security and privacy analysis of the generic UC architecture is presented in
Section 3, followed by a description of the UC landscape (Section 4) and the analysis of ten major
UC platforms (Section 5). In Section 6, we discuss our findings and conclude in Section 7.
2 A GENERIC UNIFIED COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
UC can be defined as “The interactive use of different real-time communication methods/channels
with the integration of applications and processes across multiple devices and media types presenting a
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Fig. 1. High-level generic UC architecture - multipoint
consistent unified user interface” [40, 107]. The communication channel can carry different types of
information such as voice, video, content sharing, IM, and user presence information.
Besides the components exposed to the end-user, i.e., the UC client or interface, UC systems
rely on server-side infrastructure to handle call control, registration, and coordination of the
communication channels. This UC infrastructure can either be deployed externally, by a private
or public cloud provider, hosted on premises, or mixed in a hybrid model. Figure 1 shows a high-
level architecture for a UC multiparty video conference. In this example, one user invites two
participants to join a scheduled meeting on a centralized UC infrastructure, using audio and video
as communication channels on their desktop, laptop, or mobile device. The example shows a
software-based architecture, running in a web browser, without the need for additional software
plug-ins or specific hardware.
2.1 Scheduling
Participant A (1) uses a web browser on a desktop system to schedule and invite two other
participants, B and C (2), to a meeting on a centralized web-based scheduling platform (3). After
participant A completes the planning on the scheduling platform (4), invites are sent out from
the platform via e-mail or another communication channel such as SMS (Short Message Service).
The invitation is sent to all participants with the necessary meeting information such as subject,
time, message, and joining instructions (5). The reference to the meeting can be a hyperlink or a
calendar entry in a format such as iCalendar [29]. At the same time, the meeting is set up on the
UC infrastructure (7). The e-mail recipients can add the invite to their calendar system and when
the time comes, join the meeting by clicking on the invitation or by following the specified joining
instructions.
2.2 Joining a call
During the joining process, the participant’s web browser uses the signaling protocol (6) of the UC
infrastructure (7) to establish a call to the centralized UC service and to meet in a virtual meeting
room (VMR) (7). For authentication of the participants and the presenter/organizer, a PIN (e.g. a
six-digit number) could be generated by the scheduling system and shared with the participants.
The authentication information is often included in the invite by the scheduling system. After all
the participants have joined the VMR the meeting can begin.
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2.3 Centralized vs. Decentralized Architecture
A multipoint call (P2M), in contrast to a peer to peer call (P2P), can host more than two concurrent
users on a Multipoint Control Unit (MCU), which handles the media sessions and mixes the different
communication channels (e.g. audio & video). A multipoint architecture provides better scalability
and additional media transcoding capabilities between different audio and video codecs. However,
P2P architectures have the advantage that the media, and part of the signaling is exchanged directly
between participants, which means that centralized call control is needed only to organize the call.
3 GENERIC SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The generic UC architecture described above is subject to a large number of security and privacy
threats. In this section, we use STRIDE and LINDDUN to systematically analyze these threats.
3.1 Context for Analysis
3.1.1 Use Scenarios. The users of our generic UC architecture are regular computer users who
need not be familiar with the technical components of the UC architecture. No administrator
or operator is needed to set up and join a meeting, and the whole process can be realized as an
end-user self-service. The number of participants in a meeting can range from two to ten or more,
and participants do not need to be from the same organization. Audio, video, and content (screen
sharing) are used as communication channels.
3.1.2 External Dependencies. Theminimum requirements for the user to use the UC architecture are
a computer or mobile device with a supported web browser, a microphone, an Internet connection
and optionally, a camera. Most available UC systems depend on a web browser plug-in or dedicated
client to be installed. The requirement to install additional software may be avoided for a better
end-user experience and to reduce operating system dependencies.
WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication) is a real-time communication technology which
provides UC services (voice, video, generic data) built in to most modern web browsers, including
Google Chrome 28+, Mozilla Firefox 22+, Safari 11+, and Opera 18+. WebRTC is implemented via
JavaScript APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). For native clients, libraries are available
for Android and iOS applications that provide the same functionality [43]. The World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standardized WebRTC as open
standard [11]. However, a well-known security and privacy issue is that WebRTC exposes the user’s
private and public IP addresses regardless of the use of VPN or anonymous network such as Tor. This
exposure is caused by WebRTC utilizing the ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) protocol
to solve the problems associated with firewalls and NAT (firewall traversal of UC communication),
and results in WebRTC silently leaking peer IP addresses without the user’s permission [1, 111,
140, 151]. This issue can be solved by using a browser extension or gateway that examines the
WebRTC communication for suspicious requests and asks the user for permission to continue. The
disadvantage of using a browser extension is the requirement for individual implementations per
browser type, and the disadvantage of the gateway approach is an additional delay for the web
communication caused by the verification process [34].
The UC architecture itself may be hosted in a public or private cloud environment to remove the
complexity of operating the various components on-premises and to provide better scalability and
resiliency, but deployments on-premises are possible.
We focus our analysis on threats against the UC architecture and its components, and therefore
consider out of scope, threats based on a compromise of the underlying hardware or operating
system, threats such as social engineering, and intentional or accidental administrator actions.
Examples of this include taking pictures of messages and stolen, lost or hacked devices. We follow
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Fig. 2. Data flow diagram (DFD) for a generic UC architecture with multipoint participants.
the Internet Threat Model guidelines and assume that the attacker has complete control of the
communications channel between end systems [113]. Passive attackers are able to read from the
network, and active attackers can also write to the network.
3.2 Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
A data flow diagram (DFD) is an essential instrument for security and privacy analysis [65, p. 225ff].
Figure 2 depicts the data flow diagram for our generic UC architecture. Entities such as participants
or administrators are drawn as filled rectangles, data stores as parallel lines, trust boundaries as
dotted line rectangles, processes as filled ovals, and data flows as arrows. Elements of the DFD
are numbered hierarchically, for example, the Scheduling Platform 1.0 contains Web Scheduler
Application 1.1, Scheduling details 1.2, User Authentication 1.3, and User Details 1.4.
Trust boundaries are demarcation points in the architecture that describe areas within which
system components trust each other, e.g., the processes or data flows within the trust boundary [142,
p. 13]. Data flows between trust boundaries need to be analyzed for correctness and for assurance
that no sensitive information is leaked to a potential attacker.
The following describes the DFD components in Figure 2 in more detail, starting with the three
main entities, Participant (5.0), Organizer (6.0), and Administrator (7.0). Participant (5.0) is a regular
computer user joining a UC call on the UC Infrastructure/Service (2.0) by receiving an invitation,
e.g. via e-mail, from the Scheduling Platform (1.0) or ad-hoc using aWebRTC/UC Client (4.1) on his
computer/mobile device. Participants may belong to the same organization/group or be external.
The Organizer (6.0) who invites other participants in most cases will have additional UC meeting
control permissions such as the ability to mute all and disconnect participants. WebRTC/UC Client
(4.1) stores information related to UC calls such as connection details, cache, logs, and potentially
sensitive information such as participant names in the data store local browser/computer data (4.2).
The second entity type, Organizer (6.0), is similar to the Participant (5.0), but can additionally
schedule UC meetings with a Scheduler Web Client (3.1) and invite additional participants via the
Scheduling Platform (1.0). Organizers can create, read, update, and delete the Scheduling details (1.2)
after a successful authentication via User Authentication (1.3).
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The third entity type, Administrator (7.0), is responsible for the administration of the Scheduling
Platform (1.0) and UC Infrastructure/Service (2.0). The administrator has full access to the relevant
data stores, User details (1.4) and Scheduling details (1.2), within trust boundary Scheduling Platform
(1.0). These data stores may contain security and privacy relevant user profile information in User
details (1.4) (e.g. user/participant name, e-mail address and authentication credentials) and UC
meeting relevant information in Scheduling details (1.2) (e.g. who is meeting whom and when,
meeting connection information, meeting access codes and meeting subject). Within trust boundary
UC Infrastructure/Service (2.0), the administrator has full access (create, read, update, delete) to the
data store Log files (2.3) which may contain security and privacy relevant information similar to 1.2
and 1.4, as well as technical details and metadata regarding UC meetings (e.g. participant’s client IP
address, browser used, operating system and hostname). Data store UC configuration (2.2) contains
UC system relevant technical configuration details which are administered by the Administrator
(7.0).
The process UC Application (2.1) within trust boundary UC Infrastructure/Service (2.0) is respon-
sible for handling UC calls with WebRTC clients, including signaling and media (video, audio, etc.),
based on the Scheduling details (1.2) and the configuration of the service in UC configuration (2.2).
3.3 Threat Modeling
We follow two threat modeling methodologies, STRIDE and LINDDUN, to identify possible security
and privacy threats against the generic UC architecture, and to identify generic mitigation strategies.
We focus on generic threats against a generic UC architecture, i.e., we do not model threats for a
concrete UC system. As a result, we do not discuss concrete attacker motivations and capabilities,
nor do we quantify the impact of any attack.
3.3.1 Security Threats. We follow the STRIDE methodology to understand the potential security
threats to the generic UC architecture as well as possible mitigations [53, 123]. STRIDE looks
at six threat types from an attacker’s point of view. Spoofing threats occur when an attacker
can participate in the system while pretending to be another participant, possibly violating the
system’s authentication. For example, an attacker could claim to be a legitimate participant in a
UC call. Tampering threats are based on modifying data on disk, on a network, or in memory, and
thereby violating the integrity of the data. In a UC call, an attacker could tamper with the UC
chat communication on the network. Repudiation is claiming that somebody did not do something
or is not responsible. For example, a user could claim he did not attend a specific UC meeting.
Information Disclosure is the threat of providing information to someone not authorized to see it
and violating confidentiality. In a UC call, an attacker could eavesdrop on unencrypted video and
audio channels. Denial of Service threats are based on absorbing resources needed to provide a
service to legitimate users and violating availability of the service. For example, an attacker could
consume the network resources between UC call participants and UC infrastructure and thereby
cause an interruption or unavailability of the service. Elevation of privilege threats allow someone
to do something they are not authorized to do. For example, an attacker could gain administrator
privileges and modify the configuration of the UC infrastructure.
3.3.2 Privacy Threats. Most privacy properties in the LINDDUN framework [28] are based on
terminology proposed by Pfitzmann et al. [105] and are widely recognized in the privacy community.
The term item of interest (IOI) denotes subjects, messages, or actions. In the context of UC, IOIs can
be the real names of participants or meeting titles containing sensitive information. Pseudonyms
are identifiers of a subject other than the subject’s real name. LINDDUN covers seven privacy threat
categories. Linkability allows an attacker to infer whether or not two or more IOIs are related
within a system. For example, an attacker could link participant names to a specific UC meeting.
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Identifiability violates anonymity and pseudonymity and provides an attacker with sufficient
information to identify the subject associated to an IOI (e.g. the sender of a message). Identifiability
is a special case of linkability with the subject and its attributes involved.Non-repudiation guarantees
that a user cannot deny (repudiate) that he knows, has done, or has said something. There is a
contradiction between repudiation (security threat in STRIDE) and non-repudiation (privacy threat
in LINDDUN). The preference for repudiation/plausible deniability or non-repudiation for an
architecture depends on the use case. For example, whistleblowers will prefer repudiation so
they can deny ever having sent a certain message to protect their safety. On the other hand, a
UC meeting could be recorded to prove that a specific conversation happened providing non-
repudiation. Detectability of an IOI means that the attacker can discover whether an item exists
or not. For example a UC video/audio stream encoded via RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) is
distinguishable from other network traffic based on protocol patterns and traffic volume. Information
Disclosure is the same threat as in STRIDE. Content Unawareness means a user is not aware that
the system collects or processes user data. For example, a UC meeting participant may incorrectly
believe that his real name is not visible to other participants. Policy/consentNoncompliance describes
the case where a system does not comply with its own privacy policy. For example, a UC system
could record UC meetings without informing the participants, but state in the privacy policy that
meetings are not recorded.
3.3.3 DFD/Threat Mapping. Table 1 maps the STRIDE and LINDDUN threats to the elements of
our generic UC architecture (see the data flow diagram in Figure 2). Table cells with a number
indicate threats that will be analyzed in detail in the next section. We use the numbers as identifiers
for each generic threat. Cells marked with an X and gray background indicate a potential threat
that is either irrelevant or does not apply to the corresponding DFD element. Cells marked as
Trusted represent data flows that do not cross trust boundaries. We assume that these data flows
are trusted and will not analyze them further.
3.4 Generic Threat Analysis
To analyze the threats to our generic UC architecture, we follow the threat tree patterns from
STRIDE [123] and LINDDUN [28]. The item numbers refer to entries in Table 1. When we found
significant overlap or dependency of threats and mitigations across threat types or DFD elements,
we combined them into a single item. For example, item 3.4.9 covers one STRIDE threat and four
LINDDUN threats for all processes in the DFD.
3.4.1 STRIDE - Spoofing - External Entities. The external entities’ credentials could be obtained in
transit, during change management, or from storage. The use of standard protocols such as TLS
(Transport Layer Security) encryption for the participant’s web sessions and SSH (Secure Shell)
for the administrator can mitigate these threats in transit [110]. During credential change, strong
authentication should be used, and logging and auditing should be in place. Strong authentication
could, for example, be two factor or a challenge-response identification technique [20, 63]. File and
database access permissions need to be set accordingly for credentials stored on the server. For
credentials stored on the client or by a third party, additional authentication factors such as the
user’s IP address, machine fingerprint, or multiple authentication factors could be used. Insufficient
authentication threats can occur with null credentials, guest accounts, or anonymous accounts
and should be disabled. Predictable credentials should be avoided. For administration of a UC
infrastructure, strong authentication and encrypted tunnels for remote access are required. The
same can be required for organizers and participants.
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Table 1. Mapping of STRIDE and LINDDUN threats to the DFD elements for a generic UC architecture.
3.4.2 STRIDE - Spoofing -
link to executable files (such
manipulated process under
executable files can ensur
3.4.3 STRIDE - Spoofing
on stolen or forged key material
Key Infrastructure). To mitigate
provided by the operating system, could be used to store the key material. Attacks against the PKI
or key generation could include legal demands (law enforcement requests), and breaking in.
Spoofing can also be based on weak authentication, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, and
packet injection/modification. This can be mitigated by using machine fingerprints (e.g, MAC & IP
addresses or certificates) in combination with strong authentication and tunneling, e.g., using TLS
(mutual TLS authentication between infrastructure machines), SSH, or VPN. Similar to 3.4.1, UC
administrator, organizer, and participant communication could be the target of an attack.
3.4.4 STRIDE - Tampering - Processes. If the process input is not appropriately validated, memory
modification could result in a denial of service (see also 3.4.12), arbitrary code execution, or SQL
injection. In addition, a user or program with write access to memory can tamper processes or
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attach a debugger. Mitigation strategies should cover input validation or web application firewalls
(WAF), separating processes with sandboxing/virtualization, and access controls provided by the
operating system, such as shared memory permissions, memory protection, and anti-debugging.
Untrusted codemay call trusted code and pass malicious parameters, or called program extensions
such as APIs or plug-ins may tamper with memory. Mitigations need to ensure that lower-trusted
code cannot execute untrustworthy applications, e.g., via operating system permissions, and that
only trustworthy plug-ins are used and trusted processes are called. Input validation on passed
parameters is required. In a UC architecture the UC infrastructure/service, scheduling platform, or
web browser sessions are potential attack targets.
3.4.5 STRIDE - Tampering - Data Stores. Bypassing protection rules or the protection system are
the two main threats for tampering of data stores. If there is no protection or weak protection of
the data stores, e.g., on a file system, physical access control and access control lists (ACL) with
appropriate permissions need to be applied. In addition, file and database encryption needs to be
enabled.
Another threat category is storage capacity failures where new data cannot be stored (discarded)
or the oldest data is deleted or overwritten by new data (wraparound). Additional storage, compres-
sion, or moving data to another storage location are mitigation options. Capacity failures could
have tampering or denial of service results that are valuable to an attacker. In a UC architecture,
access to user/scheduling details, log files, and UC infrastructure configuration can occur.
3.4.6 STRIDE - Tampering - Data Flows. Data flow threats can apply to channels (e.g., e-mail
messages that include UCmeeting invitations), messages (e.g., Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) that includes WebRTC), or both. The main attack vectors
for both are no or weak integrity, weak key management, MITM, replays (re-sending of a message),
reflection (sending a message back to the sender), and collisions (sending a message with the same
sequence number as a real message). Mitigations are the same as for data flow spoofing (see 3.4.3).
3.4.7 STRIDE - Repudiation - External Entities, Processes. The first repudiation threat category is
account take-over, including accounts of the UC administrator, organizers, and participants. In case
the account was compromised, stronger authentication (see 3.4.1) could mitigate the situation. If
somebody falsely asserts that an account was taken over, strong logging could be used to mitigate.
The second threat category is claims that messages were not sent, received, have been altered, or
replayed. Mitigations for this threat are digital signatures for signing messages and logging.
3.4.8 STRIDE - Repudiation - Data Stores. Data store transaction repudiation can be mitigated
with appropriate logging. Logging should be enabled on transactions, ensuring that sufficient
and relevant information is logged. To avoid scattered logs, the logging information needs to be
consolidated and all the log entries need a correct time stamp from the involved systems. In case
repudiation is a required property for a UC architecture, logged information about scheduled
meetings and participants could achieve this requirement (see also 3.4.21).
3.4.9 STRIDE and LINDDUN - Information Disclosure, LINDDUN - Linkability, Identifiability, De-
tectability - Processes.
Side-channel threats are unintentional side effects of computation. The timing of code execution
and response times of processes via the network can reveal information about secrets, especially
cryptographic key material and other UC infrastructure details. Algorithms should be chosen with
constant execution time independent from the secret length, complexity, or protected information
(e.g., cryptographic blinding) [68]. Variations of the power consumption of a device (such as
microprocessor, encryption device, or smart card) could disclose information about the used
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cryptographic algorithm and secret keys. Possible mitigation techniques are conditional branches
or blinding of cryptographic functions. A hardware redesign depending on the specific type of
analysis attack and hardware architecture could be required to optimize the software algorithms.
Protocols can disclose information by the use of banners/headers and their behavior indicating
which software and version a specific service is running on or provide details about the UC
infrastructure and scheduling platform. These banners should be disabled or changed so as not to
disclose this kind of information.
Process logging and virtual memory operations can expose information and can be mitigated by
strong logging and use of appropriate system calls.
3.4.10 STRIDE and LINDDUN - Information Disclosure - Data Stores. Information disclosure for
data stores can occur by bypassing the protection of an operating system reference monitor through
which all access requests pass. Potential targets in a UC architecture are user andmeeting scheduling
details, log files, architecture configuration, or meeting recordings.
Mitigation options include changing to a stricter and better implemented operating system,
encryption, and physical access protection. Metadata of data elements could lead to information
disclosure of data stores through names (e.g. “layoff of Bob.txt”), size, or timestamps (creation/last
access), and can be mitigated by private directories and permissions.
Physical access to data stores and backups can be protected with physical security and encryption.
Non-cleaned storage and reused memory should be manually overwritten and disks destroyed (for
decommissioning) rather than reselling the media. Overwriting of spinning media and flash storage
does not work reliably and physically destroying them is a secure option.
3.4.11 STRIDE and LINDDUN - Information Disclosure - Data Flows. Information disclosure for
data flows significantly overlaps with data flow spoofing (see 3.4.3) and data flow tampering (see
3.4.6), both in terms of attack vectors and mitigation possibilities.
3.4.12 STRIDE - Denial of Service - Processes. Common DoS threats against processes are realized
by consuming resources such as buffers, connections, disk space, or memory. Dynamic resource
allocation, quotas, virtualization and load balancing can help to mitigate these attacks.
Input validation failures can cause processes to crash, for example through buffer overflows, or
turn into on elevation of privilege problem (see 3.4.15). Mitigation options are input validation
within the application itself or a WAF in front of a web application. The WAF can review all
incoming traffic and filter out malicious inputs that target security vulnerabilities.
Locks on resources can lead to resource lockout problems if service is denied to other locks.
Releasing locks immediately or virtualization/separation of processes can mitigate this attack.
In case of UC web service access, joining a meeting via a provided URL in a web browser
(WebRTC), with inappropriate protection such as rate limiting or access verification, the service
could be overloaded with requests exhausting the process capacity and impact service availability.
3.4.13 STRIDE - Denial of Service - Data Stores. Denial of service against data stores through
squatting (claiming a port, named pipe, etc.) can be limited by appropriate permissions to the
resource object. Access to a data store might be denied by modifying ACLs or taking and holding
a resource lock. Appropriate access/lock permissions and moving the data store somewhere an
attacker cannot modify permissions and cannot create locks can mitigate this kind of attack.
Exceeding the capacity of data stores by hitting resource quotas, e.g. disk space or bandwidth,
can cause a DoS. Adding more disk space or using quotas to limit the DoS to a single application
instead of the entire system can help postpone such attacks. Moving processes closer to the system
that is accessing the data stores (cloud services or data centers) can improve the bandwidth limit.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2021.
Security and Privacy in Unified Communication 1:11
Without limits on UC meeting recordings and appropriate retention periods, data store capacity
could fill up and cause a DoS for writing logs or storing further recordings.
3.4.14 STRIDE - Denial of Service - Data Flows. DoS against a data flow could include initiating
a connection or action before a legitimated user does (pre-play), incapacitating services by ab-
sorbing CPU cycles, memory, network ports (squatting), bandwidth or disk space. Dropping or
limiting (setting thresholds) for slow or multiple sessions, load balancing, virtualization of processes,
appropriate permissions to resources, and additional resources could improve the availability.
Corrupt messages for data flows can occur in the case of no or weak integrity checks (see also
3.4.6). Increasing capacity, connection rate limiting, or secure tunneling can mitigate this attack.
Similar to DoS against processes (3.4.12), a high number of connection requests could exhaust
the network bandwidth or sockets, which could lead to service unavailability.
3.4.15 STRIDE - Elevation of Privilege - Processes. Dynamic corruption through input validation
failures (e.g. stack smashing or heap overflow) and memory access can lead to elevation of privilege
and execution of arbitrary code (see also 3.4.4 and 3.4.12, and for static corruption 3.4.5). Insufficient
authorization through call-chain issues may be used as an attack vector (see 3.4.4).
A potential attacker could gain administrative privileges on the UC architecture and access
sensitive information such as user data, meeting recordings and scheduling information.
3.4.16 LINDDUN - Linkability - External Entities. One precondition for the linkability of two
pseudonyms is that data flows or data stores are not fully protected (e.g. not encrypted) (see
also 3.4.10 and 3.4.11). The second precondition requires the linkability of Personal Identifiable
Information (PII) based on temporary user ID, IP address, behavioral patterns such as time, frequency
and location, session ID, communication content or a combination of these factors. In a case where
the attacker has access to the identity management data store which contains personal identifiers of
users, different pseudonyms for the same user can be easily linked. Identity management systems
with a focus on privacy, such as Idemix, can help to mitigate this threat [17, 50, 55, 146].
Linkability of external entities in a UC architecture can occur, for example, if a UC meeting
participant uses a pseudonym during a meeting and the scheduling database stores the pseudonym
together with the user’s real name or IP address.
3.4.17 LINDDUN - Linkability/Identifiability - Data Stores. Data store linkability and identifiability
requires weak access control to persistent data (e.g. databases) leading to information disclosure, and
insufficient data anonymization or the possibility of strong datamining in the data store. This implies
that the stored information still contains sufficient references to the corresponding data subject,
which makes it possible to link different data items within the same database. Redundancy of data
or the possibility of linking data between multiple different databases can cause re-identification. To
mitigate, the stored data should be minimized and combined with data anonymization techniques
such as k-anonymity [120] or differential privacy [30]. In a UC architecture, linkability at the data
store can occur, for example, when the pseudonym of a participant stored in the scheduling database
and the real name stored in the user database can be linked via entries in log files.
3.4.18 LINDDUN - Linkability/Identifiability - Data Flows. The two preconditions for the linkability
and identifiability of data flows are that the data flow is not protected (e.g. no encryption, see also
3.4.11) and that the communication is linkable because of the use of an insufficient anonymity
system or the lack of such a system. If there is no anonymous communication system, the same
preconditions apply as for linkability of entities. The data flows can be linked to each other by the
user’s identifiable information such as IP address, session ID or computer ID (see 3.4.16). With
inadequate anonymity systems, traffic analysis allows the extraction of information from patterns
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of traffic, passive attacks (e.g. traffic correlation, fingerprint or route selection), and active attacks
(e.g. sybil attack or traffic watermarking) [117]. To mitigate, anonymity technologies may include
Tor and AN.ON [7, 147].
Linkability and identifiability via data flows are possible if an attacker can link IP addresses,
pseudonyms, or real names that are transferred during UC meetings.
3.4.19 LINDDUN - Identifiability - External Entities. Identifiability of entities can occur in four
cases. Firstly, if the real identity is used as a login (e.g. firstname.lastname) and at the same time, the
data flow between the user and login system is not sufficiently protected, the user’s identity will
be exposed. Secondly, if a secret (e.g. PIN or password) is used for login, the relationship between
this secret and the user can be disclosed if either the passwords are not protected in the identity
management database and can be connected to the user (e.g. social insurance number, date of
birth, etc.), or the passwords can be revealed through replay attacks, key loggers, communication
eavesdropping, or by observing the user inputting the secret. The third case is a weak implementa-
tion of software or physical token for login. The fourth case is when biometrics, used for login,
are retrievable and can be linked to an entity, for example caused by information disclosure of
the identity management database or data flows containing biometrics that are linkable to data
stores. The use of secure pseudonymization for user identifiers and privacy-enhancing identity
management systems (PE-IMS) [17, 50, 55, 146] in combination with anonymous communication
such as Tor [7, 147] can mitigate these threats. Some UC architectures relay calls via a central
infrastructure component where all meeting participants are connected. In this case the UC service
provider is able to identify participants, for example based on their logins or IP addresses. Users of
such architectures need to trust the service provider to handle this information accordingly.
3.4.20 LINDDUN - Non-repudiation - Processes. The non-repudiation of a process implies that it
cannot be denied that the process has been run. This can happen in a case where the process loses
its confidentiality and information disclosure attacks at the process are possible (see also 3.4.9) or
the process uses logs including all actions, which can be traced back to the user. In the context of a
UC architecture, logging could prove that a specific meeting has taken place and cannot be denied.
3.4.21 LINDDUN - Non-repudiation - Data Stores. Non-repudiation is when a subject cannot deny
certain data in a data store. This data can be stored by the user himself or by somebody else who
has stored data about the subject. There are three threat preconditions. Firstly, when little or weak
deniable encryption is used to protect the data, it can be proven that data are encrypted or can be
decrypted to a valid plain text. Secondly, when there is weak access control to the database, the
stored data are no longer deniable. This can occur when there is a threat of information disclosure
at the data store (see also 3.4.10). Thirdly, if subjects want deniability, but are not able to edit data in
the database to cover their tracks, their data becomes non-repudiable. It can be either impossible to
remove or alter the user’s own data or impossible to remove or alter someone else’s data concerning
the user himself. Non-repudiation is a threat also in the context of the GDPR which grants a right
to erasure, or the right to be forgotten (Art. 17) [33]. Non-repudiation with respect to data stores
can happen in a UC architecture if it is not possible for a UC user to delete their account from the
user database, including historical logged data with PII.
3.4.22 LINDDUN - Non-repudiation - Data Flows. Non-repudiation of a data flow implies that
the subject cannot deny having sent a message. This can occur when data sources of flows are
insufficiently obfuscated, when there is weak deniable encryption, weak MACs, or weak off-the-
record messaging are used. Possible mitigations include off-the-record messaging [16], deniable
authentication, and deniable encryption [95]. A UC related threat is when an attacker can prove
that a user sent or received, via the UC architecture network, a specific message such as an IM.
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3.4.23 LINDDUN - Detectability - Data Stores. The knowledge that an item of interest exists,
without having access to it, can expose sensitive information. For example, a file on a server of a
minority group with the full name as the file name of a person can disclose the information that
this person is associated with this organization, even when the file content is inaccessible.
Detectability at the data store can occur when there is insufficient access control, because of
information disclosure threats (see also 3.4.10) and if insufficient information hiding techniques are
applied, such that information is revealed due to weak steganography algorithms which enable
steganalysis attacks [3]. In a UC architecture, detectability at the data store can happen when the
attacker can prove that a specific user exists on the system, for example in a case where user names
or other PII is stored in clear text in logged data or the user database.
3.4.24 LINDDUN - Detectability - Data Flows. Knowing that a message has been sent can reveal
sensitive information, even if the message contents are unknown. For example, if a user calls a civil
rights organization from his private computer, the user could be labeled as an activist even without
knowing the content of the call. Detectability of data flows can occur when a weak covert channel
uses too much bandwidth from a legitimate channel. Also, by analyzing protocol signatures or the
timing of requests, patterns or characteristics of the communication could lead to detection.
Side-channel attacks such as timing information, power consumption, or electromagnetic leaks
can result in detectability of data flows. Steganalysis attacks are possible when weak information
hiding techniques are used [3]. Sufficient dummy traffic on the communication network is required
to prevent detectability and to ensure the data appear random, except for the sender and recipient(s).
Finally, a weak spread spectrum communication can result in detectability of data flows. For
example by allowing eavesdropping caused by inadequate establishment of secure communications,
insufficient resistance to natural interference, jamming, or fading.
3.4.25 LINDDUN - Content Unawareness - External Entities. Content unawareness can occur when
data subjects provide more information than required, or when they are unaware what data the
system stores about them. For example, a UC provider could analyze a user’s video stream to infer
information from the user’s face or background. Organizations commonly use privacy policies to
inform users about data collection, however, privacy policies have been shown to be long and difficult
to understand, which makes them ineffective [2, 78]. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project [79]
was an approach to make privacy policies machine-readable and thereby allow automated matching
against user preferences. However, P3P was discontinued in 2018 because of its complexity and
low adoption rate by web browser vendors. Recently, advances in machine learning have made
automated analysis of privacy policies possible [51]. Personal information feedback tools have also
been suggested [75, 100] to help users gain privacy awareness and self-determine which personal
data to disclose.
3.4.26 LINDDUN - Policy/consent Noncompliance - Processes, Data Stores, Data Flows. Policy
noncompliance, based on legal requirements such as the GDPR, can occur when the internal system
behavior does not correspond with the privacy policy provided to the user. This can happen if an
attacker tampers with the internal policies or when the policy rules are incorrectly managed by the
system administrator. A non-technical approach could be to train administrators and employees of
the UC architecture and penalize disclosure of user information in combination with audits.
3.5 Mitigation Controls, Strategies and Techniques
Table 2 summarizes how the mitigation controls described above, map to the threats and DFD
elements from Table 1. The table shows that mitigation controls for security threats on the left-hand
side aremore represented thanmitigations for privacy threats on the right-hand side, except for areas
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- Strong authentication x x x x x
Access permissions
- File system, database, memory, object per-
missions (ACLs)
x x x x x x x x x x x
Encryption
- Tunnelling with cryptography and in-
tegrity checks (TLS, SSH, etc.)
x x x x x
- File, data store, and database encryption x x x x x
- Cryptographic algorithms optimized for




- Signing/verification of executable files x
- Sandboxing/virtualization x x x x x x
- Physical access/security x x x x x x
- Input validation/sanitisation/WAF x x x
- Process call chain (preventing execution
of untrusted code)
x x
- Decommission physical media x
DDoS prevention
- Load balancing (network) x x
- Storage and memory capacity mitigations
(discard, log-rotation, compress, move)
x x x
- Optimize bandwidth based on location of
architecture components
x
- Limitation of concurrent connections
with timeouts and thresholds
x
Repudiation/(Plausible Deniability)
- Strong logging (appropriate information,
consolidated, and time synchronized)
x x x x
- Privacy preserving authentication (off-
the-record messaging, deniable authenti-
cation)
x x
- Deniable encryption x
- Digital signatures for signing x
Users can securely delete data
- Personal information feedback tools x
Secured meeting invitations




- Anonymous Communication (Tor,
AN.ON)
x x x x x
Undetectability
- Steganography, dummy traffic x x




- Persistent-data anonymization x
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of overlap such as encryption. The most important mitigations by occurrence are authentication,
access control, and encryption, i.e., classic techniques from computer security. One reason for
this may be a higher interest in security, because it often protects assets with a monetary value
compared to privacywhich protects personal data. This points to a need formore research on privacy
protections, awareness-raising, and adoption of privacy protections in deployed architectures.
For four threats, very limited technical mitigations are available; spoofing of processes (3.4.2),
linkability of data flows (3.4.18), content unawareness (3.4.25), and policy non-compliance (3.4.26).
Although some of these threats may be addressed with non-technical mitigations, such as audits
and user training, the lack of technical mitigations points to a need for further research. A first step
towards a technical solution for policy non-compliance is the automated analysis of flow-to-policy
consistency, i.e., the comparison of observed data flows with policy statements [4].
4 THE UNIFIED COMMUNICATION LANDSCAPE


















Fig. 3. Classification of UC market segments [52].
The three feature classes are Enterprise Voice (EV), EV-enabled Unified Communication, and
Unified Communication. EV provides IP telephony experience on a UC capable platform, but only
desk phones or softphones with a headset are deployed (segments 1, 4, and 7 in Figure 3). Unified
Communication (UC) providing a UC-only experience is mostly deployed as a UC software client
with no PBX calling features and no access to the public switched telephone network (PSTN)
(segments 3, 6, 9). The combination of EV+UC describes telephony-enabled UC solutions deployed
as UC software clients, with the optional deployment of desk phones (segments 2, 5, 8).
The second categorization is the deployment type of the architecture. Public Hosted (UCaaS)
describes UC solutions deployed in a provider’s data center on a multi-tenant platform (segments 7,
8, 9 in Figure 3). Private Hosted UC solutions are deployed in a provider’s data center, with the
service dedicated to the enterprise (segments 4, 5, 6). On-Premises describes UC solutions deployed
in the enterprise’s data center (segments 1, 2, 3). The type of deployment is important because it
influences which mitigations are available for security threats of the category secure infrastructure
deployment and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) prevention (see Table 2).
The third categorization is the availability and the type of licensing; commercial closed source
license support model, open source, open source with optional commercial support, and end
consumer freemium. Freemium models provide the base functionality for free, whereas premium
features are payable, and free users need to accept collection of user data for tracking or advertising.
Table 3 shows the feature type, deployment type, licensing type, and available UC features of the
ten architectures we will evaluate in detail. We focus on UC architectures from market segments
EV+UC (segments 2, 5, 8 in Figure 3) and UC (segments 3, 6, 9). We exclude enterprise voice-only
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Table 3. Overview of the key properties and functionality of ten UC platforms.
Signal 
Messenger 




















Organisation jurisdiction USA USA Switzerland Open Source USA
Luxembourg/
USA
USA USA USA USA
Estimated users not disclosed 2 billion (4) not disclosed not disclosed 200 million (5) 300 million (4) 390 million (4) 300 million (4) not disclosed 100 million (5)





























































Audio 1:1 yes yes (3) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Video 1:1 yes yes (3) yes yes yes yes yes yes (1) yes yes
Instant Messaging 1:1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Instant Messaging 1:n yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Audio 1:n no yes (3) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Video 1:n no yes (3) yes yes yes yes yes yes (1) yes yes
Content sharing no no yes yes yes yes yes yes (2) yes yes
VMR/Scheduling 
for meetings
no no no yes yes no yes no yes yes
1:1 = a conversation between two participants (1) only on Windows, macOS, Linux client (4) estimated monthly active users
1:n = a conversation between multiple participants (2) only on macOS and Windows client (5) estimated daily meeting participants





























products and solutions, including handsets. In addition, we exclude systems that require specific
video conferencing hardware or telephone handsets. We evaluate only UC architectures that provide
audio and video collaboration with two or more participants as well as live chat. Because our focus
is on security and privacy, we have included platforms that provide interesting security and privacy
properties (Signal, Wire, Jitsi) as well as a selection of mainstream UC applications to show which
security and privacy features are commonly implemented.
5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF UNIFIED COMMUNICATION PLATFORMS
We will now evaluate the security and privacy features of ten major UC platforms, based on a
review of academic literature and technical documentation. The amount and detail of information
available regarding security and privacy controls on the various UC platforms is highly variable.
We have included detailed information whenever available, not just to describe the specific tool,
but also to illustrate how a control of that type might work for other tools. However, some details
can become outdated quickly due to the fast-paced evolution of these platforms. Table 3 gives an
overview of the functionality of the ten platforms, and Table 4 shows their security and privacy
features, structured following the generic analysis in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. A gray background
indicates an area of concern, which is discussed in Section 6.
5.1 Signal Messenger - Signal Messenger LLC & Signal Foundation
The Signal Messenger client, owned by Signal Messenger LLC and the Signal Foundation, is the
successor of RedPhone and TextSecure which were first launched by Whisper Systems in 2010. The
services were stopped shortly after Twitter acquired Whisper Systems in 2011, and resumed when
Twitter released TextSecure and RedPhone in 2011 and 2012 under the GPL (GNU General Public
License). In 2013, Moxie Marlinspike left Twitter and founded Open Whisper Systems to continue
RedPhone and TextSecure. In 2014 and 2015, Open Whisper Systems merged the two programs into
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the Signal Messenger and made them available under the GPL and AGPL (Affero General Public
License) for several platforms, including Android, iOS, Microsoft Windows, macOS, and Linux [84].
5.1.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. Signal Messenger requires users to register with a
telephone number. This raises some privacy concerns because the end-user has to expose their
phone number to Signal. As a measure to prevent access to user data, Registration Lock adds an
additional PIN verification before users can register a new device to their phone number. On Android
and iOS, Screen Lock can be enabled to unlock the app with a PIN, passphrase, or biometrics [125].
5.1.2 Encryption. The client provides end-to-end encrypted communication channels for voice
and video calling, IM and file transfer based on the Signal Protocol. Signal updates the session
key with every new message in a process called ratcheting [144], which provides perfect forward
secrecy (PFS) and protects against MITM attacks. Signal also provides deniable communication with
the support of Off-The-Record Messaging (OTR), ensuring that whenever Alice sends Bob a specific
message, Bob cannot prove to Mallory (a 3rd party) that Alice sent him the message [56, 83].
5.1.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. The central servers are operated by Signal Messenger LLC
and the Signal Foundation [126]. A significant difference to other UC platforms and especially other
platforms based on the Signal Protocol, such as WhatsApp, is that the owner is a not-for-profit
foundation with open-source in mind. Currently there are no indications that Signal Messenger
will be monetized, for example with advertising.
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5.1.4 Privacy. In contrast to WhatsApp, Signal Messenger does not send the contact list to the
server in clear text (see 5.2). Instead, it hashes the phone numbers before sending them to the server.
The server responds with the common contacts and discards the query. There is no cloud backup
functionality which could expose the messages. Signal supports disappearing messages which are
removed on the sender’s and receiver’s devices a specified length of time after they have been seen.
On Android, local backups can be enabled by the user [77]. The Censorship Circumvention feature
allows the bypassing of censorship in countries such as Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and UAE with the help
of Domain Fronting. This functionality is based on the country code of the phone number used
for registration. However, Google and Amazon stopped this technology by changing their terms
of service [85]. Signal is working to provide an alternative for Domain Fronting. Alternatively,
censorship can be bypassed by routing the client traffic through the Signal infrastructure. No
communication metadata is stored on the central servers. The source code for the client and server
components is public and has been formally peer-reviewed [25, 124]. The Signal Messenger received
recommendations and positive feedback from prominent security and privacy experts [18, 122].
5.2 WhatsApp - Facebook
WhatsApp Messenger, owned by Facebook since 2014, is a popular free software with 2 billion
users as of 2021 [141]. The client is available on many platforms with a focus on mobile devices.
The services, based on the Signal Protocol, include IM, audio and video calls, and media sharing
capabilities such as sharing pictures with individual users or groups.
5.2.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. During the installation of the WhatsApp client, the
client requests a PIN from the server, via SMS, to the phone number of the smartphone. After the
PIN has been received, the client requests a unique key from the server, which is stored locally
and used for further authentication [26]. The user’s phone number is used as a user ID. Two-factor
authentication can be enabled by the user to add a PIN for client authentication. To log in from a
browser or a tablet, a QR code is displayed and needs to be scanned by the registered smartphone to
authenticate the additional device. The WhatsApp client uploads locally stored phone numbers to
the WhatsApp/Facebook infrastructure without notifying the user, to find WhatsApp users among
the client’s contacts. Users cannot select specific phone numbers to upload. Point to point (1:1) and
multipoint (1:n) audio and video calls are supported with up to three participants. All calls are ad
hoc, i.e., there is no call scheduling or VMR functionality. To verify what is stored byWhatsApp, the
user can request the relevant GDPR information from Facebook. During the registration process, the
SMS confirmation, as out of band authentication, can be spoofed or retrieved by social engineering
and is prone to identity fraud. The same attack vector applies to the QR code association to bind
other devices to a registered smartphone. The requirement to use a phone number to register
raises privacy concerns because it exposes the end-user’s phone number. A security issue is that a
WhatsApp account may be taken over by taking over the phone number. There have been incidental
reports of this happening through “retired” and reused phone numbers or attackers taking over the
mobile account by talking to the mobile carrier while impersonating the user, either by phone or in
a store, and asking to port a phone number to a new service or device (“SIM swapping”) [168].
5.2.2 Encryption. In April 2016, Facebook announced end-to-end encryption to provide authenti-
cation and confidentiality for all communication, based on the Signal Protocol in partnership with
Open Whisper Systems (see see Section 5.1) [108, 159]. For audio and video call setup between
participants, the initiator transmits the session setup and SRTP (Secure Real-time Transport Proto-
col) master secret via the Signal Protocol [10, 159]. Messages are encrypted and deleted from the
WhatsApp server as soon they are retrieved by the recipient’s client. With the Signal Protocol, the
security and privacy risks in transit have been reduced significantly. OTR addresses security and
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privacy properties such as repudiation and plausible deniability, but the metadata, including mobile
phone numbers, groups, timestamps on messages, device types, profile pictures, and contacts are
visible and stored by Facebook. The storage of keys, contacts, messages, and media on mobile de-
vices and computers introduces attack vectors that depend on the security and privacy capabilities
of the client’s operating system. The functionality to backup to a cloud drive, e.g., Google Drive,
is another risk, because Facebook provides no further information about possible encryption of
backups. Forensic analysis of artifacts left by WhatsApp on Android allows reconstructing of the
list of contacts and the chronology of the messages that have been exchanged by users [6]. This is
a potential security and privacy threat on the linkability between individuals and conversations by
correlating these artifacts.
5.2.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Facebook’s closed source and public cloud architecture
approach uses a modified XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) server running on
FreeBSD and Erlang as the core infrastructure deployed globally on hundreds of nodes processing
billions of messages per day [26].
5.2.4 Privacy. The client uploads contact information, without knowledge of the user, from the
user’s device to the WhatsApp infrastructure, which allows reconstructing of the social network
relations between users, groups and sent messages. This information could be sold (data monetiza-
tion), used for targeted ads, or revealed to government institutions. There are plans by Facebook
to use the WhatsApp metadata within Facebook, which gives them the power to create full user
profiles with data aggregated from different sources [108]. The EU Commission has fined Facebook
€110 million for providing false information during the 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp wherein
Facebook claimed that “it would be unable to establish reliable automated matching between Facebook
users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts”. However, Facebook started automatic matching
of user identities in 2014 [31]. In August 2016, Facebook changed the terms of service so that
WhatsApp users now agree that their data can be shared with other Facebook companies. The only
way to avoid that is to delete the WhatsApp account [161]. In January 2021, WhatsApp changed
their Privacy Policy for users outside the European Union to allow sharing of information with
other Facebook companies. Users not accepting the new terms are denied the service [160].
WhatsApp is considered standard consumer software whose security properties were enhanced
well after it gained mass adoption, which means that its presence on a mobile phone is not likely to
arouse suspicion of “subversive” activity. When the user re-installs WhatsApp on a new phone,
messages that are waiting to be delivered are automatically re-encrypted and resent by the sender.
However, the sender cannot verify whether the new recipient is the originally intended recipient.
This behavior of WhatsApp may be an acceptable trade-off if the priority is message delivery [149].
Governments and law enforcement agencies across the world regularly express their unease at
the strong confidentiality that WhatsApp provides through its end-to-end encryption, typically
presenting the use for organized crime and child sexual abuse as problematic situations. Countries
such as China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates have banned WhatsApp
completely, with additional potential motivations being the protection of local telecommunication
companies (economical) and the suppression of dissent (political) [171].
5.3 Wire - Wire Group Holdings GmbH/Wire Swiss
Wire was founded in 2012 by former Skype and Microsoft employees with headquarters in Berlin
and offices in Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States. The Wire client is available on Android,
iOS, Windows, macOS, Linux, and several web browsers. It features messaging, voice/video calling,
file-sharing, and search, all protected by end-to-end encryption. Wire hosts over 1300 enterprise
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customers and claims to be the fastest growing collaboration platform in the world [163]. Detailed
information about Wire’s operation, security, and privacy features is available [166, 167].
5.3.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. Registration consists of a mandatory user registration
and optional client and push token registrations. Registration by e-mail and by phone are the two
basic registration flows, with the verified phone number or e-mail serving as the user identifier. In
both cases, the Wire server sends a random verification code to the client, either via e-mail or text
message (SMS), and allows three attempts to respond with the correct verification code before a
new verification code needs to be requested. Upon successful registration, the client receives a Wire
internal ID and authentication cookie. Users have to provide a non-unique profile name, and the
user profile additionally stores the profile picture, accent colors, language, cookie label, timestamp
of registration, IP geographic location, and web application settings. After user registration, the
conversation contents are synchronized across all of the user’s devices. Passwords are passed into
the scrypt key derivation function with a random salt [101, 102]. The resulting hashes are stored
along with the salt and parameters on the Wire server. On the client, passwords are kept only in
volatile memory.
Client registration is limited to eight client applications per user to limit the computations needed
when sending encrypted messages. Wire’s protocol overlaps significantly with Signal’s protocols,
for example using, Double Ratchet for key management [38, 82, 83, 103]. Prekeys are generated
by the client based on Curve25519 and stored locally to initiate cryptographic sessions. During
registration, the prekeys are bundled with the client’s public key and uploaded to the Wire server.
These key bundles can be used by other clients to asynchronously initiate end-to-end encrypted
communication even if the recipient is offline. The server removes used prekeys immediately and
clients regularly need to upload fresh prekeys. During client registration, Wire collects the device
class (mobile, tablet, desktop), model (e.g. iPhone 8), a label to distinguish clients, cookie, password,
timestamp, and IP geographic location. As soon as a new client application is linked to an account,
all other clients of the same account are notified via e-mail.
Push token registration allows clients to receive notifications over Google Firebase Cloud Mes-
saging (FCM) or Apple Push Notification (APN) in case the device is offline (no data connection).
Wire’s authentication protocol uses a combination of short-lived (15 minute) access tokens and
long-lived user tokens. Authentication requests via the API against Wire infrastructure resources
are protected by access tokens and user tokens are used to continuously obtain new access tokens.
All tokens are strings signed with Ed25519 by the server including the UUID (Universally Unique
Identifier) and expiration time sent as HTTP cookies. The user tokens and cookies can be persistent
or session-based and are selected during login by the client. The cookies follow the same semantics
as those specified by the HTTP protocol. Wire supports two different login types; password login
and SMS login. As soon as users add a password to their account or have verified a phone number
they are able to login. During login the client chooses the type of login, session or persistent, with
a corresponding cookie placed after successful login. For password login, the client provides an
e-mail address or phone number together with the password transmitted to the server via TLS.
The server verifies the provided login name and password using scrypt and issues a new user and
access token as an HTTP cookie. Users registered with a verified phone number can login via SMS
following the same procedure as during registration.
5.3.2 Encryption. Text messages and assets (larger binary entities such as pictures) are end-to-end
encrypted between two clients with Proteus, Wire’s main cryptographic protocol [164]. Proteus
is suitable for use in asynchronous environments through its use of prekeys as described above.
Two parties do not need to be online at the same time to initiate an encrypted conversation.
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The cryptographic primitives used in Proteus are ChaCha20 (cipher), HMAC-SHA256 and Diffie-
Hellman Curve25519 (message authentication codes), and HKDF (HMAC key derivation function)
[13, 14, 70, 71]. Users can call each other in 1:1 or group conversations. Group conversations are
established via a full mesh of end-to-end encrypted 1:1 calls between all pairs of participants. The
call signaling is encrypted with Proteus and uses SDP (Session Description Protocol) to negotiate the
client call capabilities [49]. Endpoints establish media flows directly when possible, with the help of
ICE and TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) servers to identify the most suitable transport
path [80, 118]. The TURN servers are part of the Wire infrastructure and generic credentials are
used for authentication. TURN servers cannot associate user identifiers with a specific call record.
Wire clients use HTTPS with Strict Transport Security, TLS 1.2, with ciphers supporting forward
secrecy (PFS) and certificate pinning. SRTP is used for call media exchange, and negotiation of
encryption algorithm, keys, client authenticity verification, and parameters is achieved via the
DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) handshake [10, 86, 114]. For group calls, each call leg
of the full mesh is individually encrypted and the keys are not shared among participants. On iOS,
local data is protected via sandboxing and not synced to iCloud or iTunes backup. On Android,
access permissions protect local data and cached data, and external storage is encrypted using
AES128 (Advanced Encryption Standard). On desktop clients, Wire recommends the use of full disk
encryption such as FileVault on macOS or Bitlocker on Windows.
5.3.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. The server infrastructure is operated by Wire, but an
on-premises/private cloud deployment is possible on request.
5.3.4 Privacy. The source code for the infrastructure and clients was released in 2016 and is
available at https://github.com/wireapp under GNU AFFERO general public license V3, with the
limitation that the method in which Wire clients interact with the Wire infrastructure should not
be changed. In 2017, Wire sponsored a security audit for the web application, Android/iOS client,
and protocol implementation [165]. The audit identified no critical issues in the core cryptographic
protocol Proteus and its Cryptobox API. Some low-, medium-, and high-severity bugs were identified
in the iOS, Android, and Web client, which have since been addressed by Wire. For example, the
web application used an outdated JavaScript framework vulnerable to injection attacks. Separate
research from the University of Waterloo found that unhashed and unencrypted passwords were
sent from the web client to the Wire infrastructure via TLS [152]. As a result, server operators
could have access to cleartext passwords during authentication, and the recommendation is to use
a technology such as password-authenticated key agreement.
5.4 Jitsi - Jitsi.org
Jitsi is a collection of free and open-source multi-platform voice, video conferencing, and IM
applications under the Apache license 2.0 based on the OSGi framework. On desktop systems
such as Microsoft Windows or Linux, a web browser supporting WebRTC (e.g., Google Chrome or
Firefox) can be used as a feature-rich UC client without installing additional plug-ins or software.
There are dedicated applications and SDKs (Software Development Kits) available for Android and
iOS.
Jitsi was formed in 2003 as a student project called SIP Communicator. With the advancement
of WebRTC, the Jitsi Video Bridge was added to allow web-based multi-party video calls based
on WebRTC technology. Jitsi operates https://meet.jit.si, a version of Jitsi Meet, hosted for free
community use. Other projects include the SIP gateway Jigasi, the library lib-jitsi-meet which allows
to securely capture, playback, and stream audio and video flows, and the Chrome extension Jidesha
for calendar integration and screen sharing. Jitsi is available at https://github.com/jitsi/jitsi. The
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project is driven by the open-source community, fully funded by 8x8 Inc. (https://www.8x8.com), a
commercial cloud-based UC provider that offers a Jitsi-based cloud video conferencing service.
5.4.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. The meeting rooms are ephemeral, generated ad hoc,
and can be protected with a password or PIN. Meeting rooms are created when the first participant
joins and destroyed when the last participant leaves. No history or messages are kept once a
meeting room is destroyed. If somebody joins a meeting with a name that was in use before, a new
meeting room is generated with the same name, without any connection to previous meetings.
This reduces the potential attack vector of pre-created meetings which would make them easier to
identify and target. The meeting room name needs to be shared carefully, for instance it is wise not
to share it on social media, and PINs are recommended [59].
5.4.2 Encryption. The default settings for the jitsi-meet server support TLS with cipher suites based
on Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHE-RSA, DHE-DSA) and elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman key
exchange (ECDHE-RSA, ECDHE-ECDSA) [127]. For WebRTC traffic, TCP (Transmission Control
Protocol) port 443 and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) port 10000 must be allowed from the client
to the Jitsi server. The WebRTC framework itself does not provide end-to-end encryption between
the clients, but Jitsi includes some encryption features on top of WebRTC, depending on the way
in which Jitsi operates, P2P or Jitsi Videobridge (JVB) [112]. The P2P mode is used for one-to-
one meetings. In this case, audio and video are encrypted using DTLS-SRTP (Secure Real-time
Transport Protocol via DTLS) all the way from the sender to the receiver, even if they traverse
network components such as TURN servers [37]. JVB mode is used for more than two participants
(1:n) in a meeting. In this case, all audio and video traffic is encrypted on the network using
DTLS-SRTP, but packets are decrypted while traversing the Jitsi Videobridge. The Videobridge
never stores packets in persistent storage and processes them in memory while they are being
routed to other participants in the meeting [58]. Starting with Google Chromium 83 (May 2020), the
insertable stream API feature in Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Brave allows Jitsi Meet to manipulate
encoded packets before sending them on the network, and as a result the Jitsi community started
new efforts for end-to-end encryption support [57].
5.4.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. The Jitsi community team currently operates https://meet.
jit.si servers in six regions across the globe. It is possible to install Jitsi on premises or operate it in
a private cloud. There is no commercial support available for the Jitsi project, but help is provided
by the community via a forum and mailing lists. On the same community platform, individuals
and companies can provide or ask for support services. This could be an issue for organizations
operating a private instance of Jitsi with the need to receive external support in a timely manner.
An alternative for operating a private instance of Jitsi is to use a managed Jitsi service offered by a
third party, such as https://jitsi-hosting.eu/ or use the 8x8 Inc. UC cloud service.
5.4.4 Privacy. The open source licensing and public availability of Jitsi allows users to host their
own Jitsi instance with full control of the infrastructure. Hosted commercial Jitsi services and
the community driven https://meet.jit.si are other feasible approaches to using Jitsi. End-to-end
encryption is provided with the option to install a Jitsi client on mobile devices or only use a
supported web browser.
In the case of https://meet.jit.si all users are moderators and can, for example, mute other
participants. For stricter moderator permissions, a private Jitsi Meet instance needs to be deployed.
The public https://meet.jit.si service collects some meta data and statistics to improve the service,
including an anonymous identifier, bitrate, available bandwidth, SDP offers and answers, utilization,
and mobile app crash dumps. In cases where this data collection is not acceptable, a private Jitsi
instance can be deployed and operated.
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5.5 Zoom - Zoom Video Communications
Zoom, founded by the former Cisco Webex engineer Eric Yuan in 2011, is recognized for its user
friendly applications which are available as closed-source for Windows, Linux, macOS, iOS, and
Android. Various plug-ins allow integration, for example with Microsoft Outlook, IBM Notes,
Firefox, Google Chrome, and Skype for Business. Zoom provides free video conferences for a
limited number of participants and a limited duration. Larger or longer conferences require a paid
subscription. In December 2019, the maximum number of daily meeting participants on Zoom
was approximately 10 million. In March 2020, Zoom reached more than 200 million daily meeting
participants, which positions Zoom among the top UC service providers [169].
5.5.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. To start a meeting, the meeting host has to authenti-
cate via HTTPS to the Zoom infrastructure using their user credentials (ID and password). A unique
per-client, per-session token is used to identify each participant attempting to join a meeting. For
each meeting, a unique set of session parameters are generated by Zoom. Authenticated participants
must have access to these session parameters in conjunction with the unique session token, to
successfully join a meeting. In addition, Zoom supports Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) and OAuth as methods for single sign-on (SSO) [174].
5.5.2 Encryption. All data transmitted from the Zoom client to the Zoom cloud is encrypted in
transit with AES via TLS 1.2. The preferred method of communication is HTTPS, leveraging TLS
1.2 encryption and PKI Certificates issued by a commercial certificate authority. Signing into the
client, scheduling a meeting, chatting, polling, sharing files, and in-meeting Q&A all use TLS 1.2.
Before Zoom client version 5.0 (released May 2020), real-time traffic such as video, voice, and
content sharing used AES-256/ECB mode (Electronic Code Book), which is considered insecure.
This behavior changed with the introduction of Zoom client 5.0 and the switch to AES256/GCM
(Galois/counter mode) [174, 175].
According to Zoom, in meetings where all participants use Zoom clients and the meeting is not
recorded, all video, audio, screen sharing, and chat content is encrypted at the sending client and
not decrypted at any point until it reaches the receiving clients. Zoom clients include the Zoom
app running on a desktop or mobile device and Zoom Rooms which are specialized Zoom video
conferencing hardware. Zoom claims never to have built a mechanism to decrypt live meetings for
lawful intercept purposes, nor one to insert participants into meetings without it being reflected in
the participant list [176].
However, because Zoom is closed source, these claims are not easily verifiable. Zoom aims to
keep data encrypted throughout as much of the transmission as possible, Zoom maintains and
controls the key management system in the cloud.
Although Zoom claims that its calls are encrypted, it does not use end-to-end encryption [87].
Instead, Zoom encrypts calls with AES-256 and shares the encryption key with Zoom servers
around the globe. This potentially gives Zoom servers full access to the audio and video streams,
although the company has stated that no user content is available to its employees or servers once
encrypted [39, 175].
5.5.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Connectors allow the ZoomCloud infrastructure to connect
with other services, including traditional telephones, Conference Rooms, Skype for Business, Cloud
Recording, and Live Streaming. When a user joins a Zoom meeting from a traditional telephone,
encryption cannot be applied, which is a general technical limitation. For enterprise customers,
an on-premises solution is available for the entire meeting infrastructure. Additionally, enterprise
customers have the option to run certain versions of connectors within their own data centers
to manage the decryption and translation process themselves [39]. Researchers have also found
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encryption keys on Zoom servers in China (where the company has development sites) even when
no Chinese participants are in the call [81]. This opens the possibility that the Chinese government
could eavesdrop on calls. Zoom has reacted to this finding by allowing paying customers to opt out
of having data routed through China [104].
5.5.4 Privacy. A number of issues with Zoom have attracted public attention in early 2020, most
notably call hijacking or “Zoombombing”. Calls that are not set to private or password-protected
can be accessed by anyone who inputs the 9 to 11-digit meeting code, and researchers have shown
how valid meeting codes could easily be identified (something Zoom now says it prevents) [66].
Zoom has also had to make changes to its iPhone and iPad apps to stop Facebook being able to
collect data about users [170]. In 2019, Zoom was forced to fix a problem that could have allowed
websites to turn Mac users’ cameras on without permission [73].
As a reaction to unfavorable news reports in early 2020, Zoom announced a 90-day security
plan, starting in April 2020, that delivered several important changes; enabling AES 256-bit GCM
encryption standard for data in transit, allowing account admins to designate a data center region
of choice and allowing them to set the routing, and implementing the Zoom dashboard which
allows users to see how meetings are connected to Zoom data centers. In addition, meetings now
have passwords and waiting rooms turned on by default. Zoom has also begun security and privacy
reviews of their services with external experts and prepared a transparency report [116, 172]. Before
2020, Zoom’s privacy policy was arguably not user-friendly. By downloading the app, the user
granted the company permission to freely collect, process, and share personal data. This improved
significantly in 2020 with better disclosures regarding issues of data safety and data rights. However,
privacy issues still exist with regard to targeted advertising and third-party tracking [64, 173].
5.6 Skype - Microsoft
Skypewas founded by Janus Friis andNiklas Zennström in 2003. After an Initial Public Offering (IPO)
in 2010, Skype was acquired by Microsoft in 2011. Today, Skype is part of Microsoft as a subsidiary
headquartered in Luxembourg. Skype announced 214 billion Skype-to-Skype international minutes
in 2014 and 300 million active users per month in 2016 [72, 76, 145]. Skype was the first P2P VoIP
client and initially offered free IM and Internet telephony to save costs on international audio
calls between computers. Later, Skype added the capability to call landline and mobile numbers
from Skype clients via a telephony gateway as a paid service (SkypeOut) [129]. Currently, the
Skype client provides free IM, audio calls, and high definition video calls on a public cloud with
multiple participants. Skype is available closed-source on many platforms, including Windows,
macOS, Linux, Android, iOS, Windows Mobile, Xbox, and Amazon Alexa. Although Skype, Skype
for Business, and Teams (the successor of Skype for Business) are all offered by Microsoft, they use
different and incompatible underlying technologies. Information about Skype’s architecture and
protocols is mostly available from the time before Skype’s acquisition by Microsoft.
5.6.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. Microsoft runs central login servers for the authenti-
cation and registration of clients and users. Skype’s privacy settings give the user control over the
sharing of their contact details, online status, and who can call or IM them. As soon as a user adds
a contact to the contact list, Skype asks for contact details. If the new contact accepts the request,
both users are then able to see each other’s online status. Contact lists are stored by Microsoft and
can be exported via the web interface of Skype. The Skype client keeps local records of contact
lists, communication history, and IM content [130]. This introduces attack vectors that depend on
the implementation of the client operating system security and privacy capabilities.
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5.6.2 Encryption. Skype uses standard cryptographic primitives, such as AES 256-bit integer
counter-mode, for all signaling and communication between the clients to prevent spoofing, tam-
pering, and information disclosure. Supernodes and relay nodes do not have the keys to decipher
the communication [130]. 1024-bit RSA is used to negotiate the symmetric AES keys. The user’s
public keys are certified during login, using 1536 or 2048-bit RSA, by central servers which perform
the authentication of the Skype users with their Skype-Name and password [15]. However, the use
of proprietary protocols based on standard cryptographic primitives in a “black box” introduces
the possibility of backdoors and a master key that can decrypt all communication [106].
5.6.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. The Skype architecture consists of three types of nodes;
ordinary nodes, supernodes, and relay nodes. The ordinary node is the software installed by the
end user. Supernodes are ordinary nodes that are dynamically selected to perform additional
functions in the Skype architecture, such as searching for other nodes. To be elected as a supernode,
the client needs to meet several requirements, including having a public IP address, sufficient
memory, bandwidth, and uptime. The relay hosts relay media and signaling traffic for nodes
which cannot connect to peers directly due to firewalls or NATs (Network Address Translation).
The mechanism used by Skype for NAT/firewall traversal issues, such as firewalls blocking new
incoming connections, is a variation of STUN [9, 119, 130].
When a Skype client starts, it binds local listening sockets for random high (>1024) TCP and UDP
ports, port 443 (TCP/UDP), and port 80 (TCP). The Skype client uses TCP for signaling traffic and
prefers UDP for voice, video, and file transfer traffic. In case UDP is not available, Skype can use TCP
for media streams which introduces an additional overhead. Skype checks network connectivity
during the login process to verify if the outgoing UDP/TCP ports are available and what kind of
network address translation is used by the client’s network. Client status updates and online status
indicators of contacts are also carried out via the P2P architecture [130]. As soon as a user places a
call via the Skype client and the destination’s network address is not in the local cache, supernodes
are used to search for the recipient’s network address and its associated supernode. The caller node
can then establish a session for chat, audio, video, file transfer, or authorization requests either
directly or through a P2P relay [130].
5.6.4 Privacy. Skype’s most significant security and privacy issue is the confirmation by Microsoft
that Skype allows eavesdropping by design, by switching from client-to-client to client-to-server
encryption. Skype also works with in-country partners, admitting that “there is a possibility that
your communications and personal data could be stored, monitored, or blocked and made available to
authorized local parties, for instance law enforcement, subject to the local legal standards” [130]. In
addition, the Snowden revelations showed that Skype participates in the NSA’s PRISM program [99].
5.7 Teams - Microsoft
Microsoft has a long history in the commercial UC space, starting in the early 2000s with Exchange
Instant Messaging, followed by Windows Messenger in 2003/2005, Office Communicator in 2007,
Lync in 2010 and 2013, and Skype for Business (SfB) in 2015, 2016, and 2019. In 2017, Microsoft
started to replace the Skype for Business cloud offering with Teams to increase the pressure on
its competitors and push customers to the Teams cloud-only service [158]. The Teams client,
in contrast to traditional UC clients, has a new functionality called persistent workplace which
includes chats grouped by channels/topics and file storage including collaboration on files over
time (before and after a meeting), as well as video meetings, meeting scheduling via Microsoft
Outlook, and application integration.
Microsoft claims 390 million active users per month [74]. Supported Teams client platforms are
Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android. With Microsoft announcing the retirement of SfB, we will
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cover only Teams in more detail, despite large numbers of SfB deployments in on-premises, hybrid,
and cloud-only variants.
5.7.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. An Office 365 account is required to use Teams, and
the user needs to authenticate against Azure Active Directory (AAD). The simplest case is when all
identities are hosted and managed in Azure AD, but Teams also supports a hybrid mode where the
identities are hosted on-premises in Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services and the password
hashes are synchronized into the Microsoft cloud with Azure AD Connect. The sign-in process
into Office 365 uses industry-standard protocols such as OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect where
Azure AD is acting as the identity provider [88].
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) warns that an increasing number of Office
365 accounts have been compromised through brute force attacks and spear phishing. This is a
general attack vector that allows access to data stored by Teams. The NCSC recommends enabling
multi-factor authentication (MFA) and configuring adequate auditing, logging, and service/device
hardening [97]. Researchers have found vulnerabilities in Teams in the past, including an incorrect
implementation of the SAML Single-Sign-On (SSO) Profile which made Teams vulnerable to account
takeover and identity theft [61]. Teams is also subject to more general attacks, including EvilGinx2,
which is a MITM attack that uses phishing to extract a user’s session cookie after completed
multi-factor authentication [48].
5.7.2 Encryption. To connect to the cloud service, the Teams client requires TCP ports 80 and 443
and UDP ports 3478 through 3481 to be opened to the Internet. The TCP ports are required for
web-based content such as chat, and the UDP ports are required for media transfer such as audio
and video. The client communication with Office 365 is TLS 1.2 encrypted with AES 256. Most
Teams signaling traffic uses HTTPS-based REST interfaces, but in some cases the SIP protocol is
used, such as for the connection between Office 365 and a Session Border Controller or gateway.
The real-time media RTP flow is secured via SRTP, in which only the payload is encrypted and
keys are exchanged through the secured signaling channel. Teams uses STUN and ICE for firewall
traversal and NAT with the transport relay deployed within Office 365 [92].
5.7.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Gateway or interoperability services are available that
allow Skype, Skype for Business, and Teams to communicate with each other. For example, Skype
users can search for the Teams user’s e-mail address and send a message. As soon the Teams user
accepts the message, both are able to communicate albeit with some limitations on chat and call
functionality. For SfB users to be able to communicate with Teams, a hybrid SfB setup is required
and the SfB on-premises users need to be moved to the cloud. Teams uses closed source code and
is built on Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Graph, Office 365 groups for access management, and
identities stored in AAD. During the creation of a new team, Teams creates a new Office 365 group,
a SharePoint Online Site and document library to store files, an Exchange online shared mailbox
and calendar, and a OneNote notebook, all tied into other Office 365 applications such as Planner
and Power BI [89, 90].
5.7.4 Privacy. Microsoft claims that the customer owns and controls their data, that data is not
scanned for advertising, and that Microsoft does not have access to files in SharePoint or OneDrive
[93]. However, because the encryption and the corresponding keys are fully controlled by Microsoft,
users have no way of verifying or enforcing these claims. In addition, Teams does not support
end-to-end encryption.
Microsoft’s Office 365 Compliance Framework classifies cloud applications into four categories
(A–D) to specify the security and privacy commitment. Teams is classified in the highest category
D, where “industry leading compliance commitments are enabled by default”. Category D claims
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2021.
Security and Privacy in Unified Communication 1:27
compliance with standards such as ISO 27001 (Information security management systems), ISO
27018 (Information technology—Security techniques), EU Model Clauses (EUMC) (Transfers of
personal data outside the European Economic Area), and FedRAMP (US Federal Risk and Autho-
rization Management Program) [91]. Teams enforces team-wide and organization-wide two-factor
authentication, single sign-on through Azure Active Directory, and encryption of data in transit
and at rest. The data in Teams resides in the geographic region associated with the Office 365
tenant during creation. The files, chats, recordings, call summaries, and calendar invites are stored
in various places such as SharePoint, Exchange, Stream, OneDrive for Business, and eDiscovery.
A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) conducted in 2018 in the Netherlands identified
alarming details regarding Microsoft collecting and storing personal data and behavior of individual
users of Office 365 on a large scale without informing users [128]. In July 2019, Microsoft announced
an update to the privacy provisions in the Microsoft Online Services Terms (OST), developed
together with the Dutch ministry, which provides greater transparency regarding data processing
in the Microsoft cloud. After a request from the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), these
improved provisions have been extended to all European customers [121].
5.8 Slack - Slack Technologies
Slack (Searchable Log of All Conversation and Knowledge), launched by Slack Technologies in
2013, is a closed-source, cloud-based unified collaboration software. In 2019, Slack reached more
than 10 million daily active users [133]. The Slack client is available for Microsoft Windows, macOS,
Linux, iOS, Android, and Windows Phone. A free version with limited functionality is available, as
well as premium payable subscriptions with additional features such as video calls with multiple
participants. Conversations on Slack are organized in channels, or persistent chat rooms, within
a workspace. Channels can be shared with users inside an organization as well as with external
users. Channels support collaboration capabilities including audio and video calls, file sharing,
screen sharing, and, through integration via the Slack API, hundreds of 3rd party applications such
as Dropbox, GitHub, Box, and Zendesk [137]. Slack’s main competitor is Microsoft Teams [67].
In December 2020, Salesforce acquired Slack for $27.7Bn which increases the competition with
Microsoft Teams [94].
5.8.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. For user authentication, two-factor authentication is
supported for all versions, and OAuth with Google or SAML-based single sign-on is supported for
premium accounts.
5.8.2 Encryption. For the communication between the client and the cloud service, Slack uses
WebSockets over TCP port 443 [131]. For audio and video calls, UDP connections to port 22466
and whitelist access to the DNS domain *.slack-core.com are required, with TCP as fall-back to
the same port [132]. In transit, data is encrypted with AES256 (TLS 1.2), and SHA2 signatures are
used. Data at rest is encrypted using algorithms compliant with FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information
Processing Standard), e.g. AES256. The keys are stored on a secure server on a segregated network
controlled by Slack. With Slack Enterprise Key Management (Slack EKM), customers can use
their own encryption keys stored in Amazon’s Key Management Service (AWS KMS) for file and
message encryption. Keys can be revoked by customers in a granular way [136]. Slack does not offer
end-to-end encryption between clients, and users cannot access the data on the Slack infrastructure.
5.8.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Customer data is hosted on a shared infrastructure, in data
centers at different service providers, with logical separation between customers [138].
5.8.4 Privacy. Slack Technology claims to exceed industry standards and regulations such as ISO
27001, ISO 27018, FedRAMP, and HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) [138].
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2021.
1:28 Thomas Reisinger, Isabel Wagner, and Eerke Albert Boiten
To protect customer data, Slack follows a secure development life cycle using the open-source tool
goSDL and offers a bug bounty program to handle disclosure of security vulnerabilities [134, 135].
In 2015, Slack was hacked and user data including email addresses, usernames, hashed passwords,
and phone numbers were compromised. As a response to the hack, two-factor authentication was
added to the service [47]. Slack Technologies could be forced to hand over user data to respond to
law enforcement requests. Slack’s policy states that users will not be informed about government
information requests. The default configuration settings are weak with regard to security and
privacy and can expose sensitive information from Slack channels via email notifications that are
triggered when a user is mentioned or receives a direct message.
5.9 Webex Teams - Cisco Systems
Webex was founded in 1995 by Subrah Iyar and Min Zhu, and provides web-based collaboration
for online meetings including voice and video. Webex was acquired by Cisco Systems in 2007. It
was one of the first SaaS (Software as a Service) offerings on the market and uses closed source
code. Over the years, the service was bundled in different flavors such as Webex Meetings, Webex
Training, Webex Events, and Webex Support. In 2018, Cisco merged the Cisco Spark service into
Cisco Webex Teams and expanded the functionality with white boarding, persistent messaging,
simple guest access, and external tool integration. Cisco also integrated their hardware devices,
including VoIP telephones and video room systems, to work with the Webex cloud service. The
Webex client is available for Microsoft Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android.
5.9.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. For user authentication and authorization, SAML
is used to retrieve Key Management Service (KMS) tokens and Webex cloud tokens. All the key
material for encryption of user data, including uploaded files, IM, and presence information, is
stored in a cloud KMS operated by Cisco, or optionally on-premises in the customer network on a
Hybrid Data Security node. With the KMS token, access to encrypted data can be granted by the
user. For the Webex service or third-party access to the plain text services (including voice and
video calling and document transcoding), a service account token needs to be granted by the user
with the help of the KMS token. With this architecture of separation of the KMS and cloud micro
services, Webex Teams claims to provide end-to-end encryption without the possibility to decrypt
the data in transit or at rest [21, 22]. This claim is not valid for the real-time media which is not
end-to-end encrypted.
5.9.2 Encryption. For signaling, Webex uses HTTPS and WSS (Secure WebSockets), protected by
TLS versions 1.2 and 1.1 with 256 bit or 128 bit keys sizes and SHA-2 hash functions. Themedia traffic
for audio, video, and content streams fromWebex clients to media nodes, which are hosted by Cisco
as cloud services around the globe, uses SRTP with the cipher suite AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
[10, 24]. The Webex client initiates media traffic to the Webex cloud nodes on UDP port 5004 with
fallback to TCP port 5004 or 443. For the media node discovery process and firewall traversal,
STUN is used to identify the optimal node with a low round-trip time [23, 119]. Real-time media
communication protected by SRTP is not end-to-end encrypted. Webex decrypts all real-time media
to allow for mixing, distribution, and interoperability with the public switched telephone network.
5.9.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Webex is available as SaaS deployment and only parts
of the architecture, for example the Key Management Service, can be hosted and manged by the
customer in a hybrid setup.
5.9.4 Privacy. Cisco’s claim of secure end-to-end encryption is only met when the key material
and the KMS are under the control of the user and not Cisco Systems. For this, users need to move
to a Hybrid Data Security architecture and host the KMS in their own data center. Even with the
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hybrid setup and KMS under the control of the customer, the real-time media is not end-to-end
encrypted.
5.10 Google Meet - Google
Google Meet launched in March 2017 and replaced Google Hangouts and Google Chat within a
single application [60]. The Meet client is available on Android, iOS, and supported on major web
browsers, including Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, and Apple Safari. Dedicated hardware
products are also available, for example, the ASUS Google Meet Kit. Meet is available for free and
surpassed 100 million daily meeting participants in April 2020 [139].
5.10.1 Authentication and Access Permissions. Google Meet offers strong controls for meeting
hosts, including admitting, removing, and muting participants. All participants must have a Google
account, i.e., anonymous users are not allowed, which, according to Google, makes the platform
safer. The Meet codes for joining a meeting are 10 characters long, with 25 characters in the set e.g.
https://meet.google.com/yxo-cvxt-sko, and are not easy to guess or brute-force.
Invitation of participants is organized by e-mail address. Participants are treated as external if
their email domain is different from the host’s. To join a meeting, external participants need to be
included in the calendar invite, be invited by in-domain participants, or submit a request to join
the meeting which must be accepted by an in-domain participant. External participants can only
join meetings 15 minutes in advance to reduce the time window for a brute force attack against the
meeting code [60, 62].
5.10.2 Encryption. All Meet meetings are encrypted in transit from each participant to the Google
Cloud infrastructure, but not end-to-end between the participants. Google, as hub of the communi-
cation, is able to access all meeting content. Meeting recordings are encrypted in transit and at rest
and stored in Google Drive. Meet uses common security protocols such as DTLS and SRTP. For
data in transit, Google Cloud services use the load balancing front end with the BoringSSL open
source implementation and TLS1.3, RSA2048 for authentication, Curve25519 for key exchange,
AES-128-GCM for encryption and SHA384 as hash function. All key material is under Google’s
control. Unique encryption keys are generated by Meet for every participant and meeting which
only live as long as the meeting. The encryption keys are never stored on disk and are transmitted
during meeting initialization in an encrypted remote procedure call (RPC) [42, 62, 139].
5.10.3 Secure infrastructure deployment. Google Meet is operated on Google Cloud and claims to
be compliant with various regulations including GDPR, HIPAA, and COPPA (Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act). Google claims that Meet data is not used for advertising or sold to third
parties. Google provides detailed information regarding security aspects such as staff training,
dedicated privacy and security teams, internal audits, collaboration with the security research
community, operational security, and data access [45, 46].
5.10.4 Privacy. The requirement to use a Google account for Meet is a privacy disadvantage but
improves security by allowing only authenticated users in a meeting. Google’s public hosted UC
platform is closed source code and only some information is provided, for example the use of DTLS
and SRTP. For administrators, Google Meet keeps audit information for six months, including the
event name, description, and participant identifiers. External participant identifiers are obscured or
not shown, but for internal participants, most information (including name, e-mail, country, and IP
address) is shown in clear text. By using the Google Meet service, the user needs to trust Google
and has very limited control of the Meet platform, e.g., key material storage [41, 44].
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6 DISCUSSION
Selection criteria for UC platforms and usage guidelines can improve the security and privacy
for users. Examples include; enforcing encryption by default and making sure it is end-to-end,
locking and password-protecting meetings, holding unauthenticated users in a waiting room so the
organizer can check their identity before admitting them to the call, monitoring the participant list
to ensure no unknown participant joins, acquiring consent from participants for meeting recordings,
being aware that audio-only participants calling via a regular phone dial-in option or protocol
gateways such as SIP/H.323/WebRTC disables end-to-end encryption and being aware that file and
screen-sharing capabilities could accidentally disclose sensitive information or be used to spread
malicious programs. Organizations such as the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre provide further
guidance [96, 98].
However, selection criteria and usage guidelines rely on the availability of security and privacy
features in UC platforms. In this section, we therefore evaluate the security and privacy features
offered by the ten UC platforms compared to the generic mitigations discussed in Section 3.5. In
addition, we discuss open issues and missing features, and outline possible avenues for future work.
6.1 Comparison of security/privacy features
End-to-end encryption and open-source architectures are two fundamental security and privacy
mitigations for UC. End-to-end encryption ensures confidentiality and integrity of the communica-
tion even against the infrastructure provider or law enforcement requests directed at the provider.
Open-source architectures are essential to allow public reviews of security and privacy properties
and thereby increase the transparency of the UC service. Among the UC platforms we reviewed,
only Signal Messenger and Jitsi are open source, and only Signal, Wire, andWhatsApp fully support
end-to-end encryption, while Jitsi supports it on Chromium 83 or newer.
Authentication and access permissions. All architectures use some form of authentication, such as
username/password, except for Jitsi which does not require authentication and instead uses random
passphrases for access to ad hoc meetings. This can help provide anonymity or pseudonymity
for the users. The mobile-centered architectures, i.e., WhatsApp, Signal, and Wire, rely on phone
numbers for authentication, which can be spoofed or expose the privacy of the user. Architectures
that offer meeting scheduling, such as Wire, Zoom, Teams, Slack, Webex, and Google Meet use
role-based access permissions so that authenticated users can schedule meetings, invite meeting
participants, and have moderator permissions during the meeting.
Encryption. For data in transit, most platforms use adequate security primitives and algorithms.
Zoom updated their encryption during their 90-day security improvement program in 2020. How-
ever, the use of proprietary and closed source encryption primitives, for example in Skype, is
problematic because it enables Microsoft’s cooperation with the NSA PRISM program. Similar
issues may exist in other proprietary platforms. End-to-end encryption is supported by Whats-
App, Signal, Wire, and Jitsi. The other architectures only encrypt between a client and the cloud
infrastructure.
For data at rest, such as shared files, meeting recordings and backups, details are unclear or
unknown for WhatsApp and Zoom. The other architectures use encryption to store the data either
in the cloud, or locally on the device and rely on protection mechanisms on the user’s device, such
as Windows disk encryption.
Secure infrastructure deployment and DDoS prevention. WhatsApp, Skype, Teams, Slack, and Google
Meet are only available as public cloud offerings, which means that many implementation details
are unknown, for example details surrounding data separation, backups, or DDoS prevention.
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Cisco Webex and Zoom support hybrid deployments, where parts of the architecture are deployed
on-premises, for example the key management with Cisco Webex. In contrast, Signal, Jitsi, and
Wire are available as publicly reviewed source code and can be deployed in a private cloud or
on-premises, which provides significantly more control and responsibility for the implementation
and operation of the architecture.
Repudiation/Plausible Deniability. Plausible deniability is supported and documented only by the
mobile-centered architectures WhatsApp, Signal, and Wire. For the remaining architectures, infor-
mation regarding plausible deniability is not available, which means it is most likely not supported.
Secure data deletion on client or server. The mobile-centered architectures, along with Jitsi, support
secure data deletion. The other platforms support it partially, typically for data on the client-side.
There is no information about server-side data deletion for Skype and Webex.
Secured meeting invitations. Secured meeting invitations are only relevant on platforms with
scheduling capabilities, that is, Wire, Jitsi (one-time meeting name), Zoom, CiscoWebex, and Google
Meet. Those platforms mainly use email for calendar invites (e.g., in iCal format) and include the
joining instructions in plaintext, including a hyperlink to the meeting, meeting passcode or PIN,
and telephone dial-in numbers. This approach, while convenient, does not provide a secure way
to share meeting details. None of the platforms provide a way to exchange meeting details in
encrypted form or on a separate communication channel, although the end user might be able to
do this manually.
Anonymous communication and undetectability. Anonymity and undetectability are challenging
requirements for UC due to the network requirements for low latency, low jitter, use of UDP, and the
large volume of video/audio data. Some architectures (Signal and Skype) support or require relaying
of the media or signaling traffic through their infrastructure or through special nodes, which helps
to provide anonymity, but does not provide undetectability. Other architectures (WhatsApp, Wire
and Jitsi) use end-to-end encryption which reveals metadata including IP addresses and traffic
volumes at UC specific ports. The use of a mixing network such as Tor to provide anonymity is
typically seen as infeasible due to latency and lack of support for UDP.
6.2 Open issues
The discussion above, summarized by the gray areas of concern in Table 4, shows that most current
UC platforms provide reasonably good mitigations against security threats. However, mitigations
against privacy threats are far less available, and most UC platforms do not provide anonymous
communication, undetectability, privacy-preserving authentication, or secure meeting invitations.
In addition, formal analysis of the privacy and security properties of UC platforms is an open issue.
Anonymous communication. Anonymity in UC allows anonymous meeting participants. The con-
tents of voice or video streams may break anonymity towards other meeting participants, but
anonymity can still hold against the UC provider and passive observers on the network. Anonymity
is not limited to protecting identities and personally identifiable data, but also needs to protect
metadata that may allow re-identification in combination with other data (e.g., fingerprinting
attributes or IP addresses that can be resolved to identities by Internet providers).
Onion routing, most notably Tor, is an established method for anonymous communication on
the Internet, but its use for UC is limited because most UC platforms require UDP traffic and also
because onion routing introduces additional delays [140, 147, 148]. The first limitation could be
overcome, for example, by running WebRTC traffic over a VPN connection in TCP mode, which in
turn runs over Tor. However, this creates a complex technology stack which can cause disconnects
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and a bad user experience in UC sessions [54]. Alternatively, a virtual machine such as Whonix can
force all network traffic through the Tor network. The overhead of running a virtual machine may be
justifiable for some use cases, but network delays may still lead to a degraded UC experience [162].
In other implementations, WebRTC has been used as a censorship circumvention tool by proxying
traffic using WebRTC thereby preventing IP blocking (e.g., Snowflake or uProxy) [35, 36]. However,
this approach does not address anonymous communication or undetectability of theWebRTC-based
UC communication data flows.
Undetectability and unobservability. Undetectability in UC would allow participants to hide the fact
that they are participating in a meeting, for example from the UC provider or passive observers on
the network. In addition, undetectability could allow users to hide which UC platform was used for
a meeting. However, undetectability in the sense of shadow participants who hide their presence
from other participants is likely to be an undesirable feature. For example, Zoom publicly disavows
that their platform allows shadow participants [176].
Undetectability can be provided by adding dummy traffic or by hiding traffic within other traffic
(steganography). For example, VoIP cover traffic has been used to hide other voice traffic encoded
with a low bit-rate speech codec, for instance, so that the VoIP cover sounds meaningful and the
hidden speech is indistinguishable from the cover [69, 105, 143, 157]. However, due to the large
traffic volumes in UC applications that include video traffic, these existing approaches may not be
feasible and further research is needed on how undetectability of UC can be supported.
Privacy-preserving authentication. Privacy-preserving authentication for UC could be realized as
a lack of formal authentication, which is done, for example, in Jitsi where knowledge of the
meeting code constitutes authorization to access a meeting. Other options for privacy-preserving
authentication could be to separate authentication to meeting organizers and authentication to the
UC provider, and to ensure that the identity of authenticated users is not linkable to their actions
on a UC platform (e.g., meeting participation).
Work that provides this kind of unlinkability already exists, for example in smart metering where
fine-grained power consumption is hidden from the electricity provider [115], and in electronic toll
pricing where travel routes are hidden from the toll provider [8]. However, we are not aware of
work that explores similar approaches for UC.
Secured meeting invitations. Secure meeting invites should be realized so that none other than the
invitee can read content of the invite, providing confidentiality and supporting anonymity for
meeting participants. In addition, undetectable meeting invites could be a desirable feature, so that
none other than the invitee can learn that the message is a meeting invite.
Most platforms rely on email for meeting invites, which could be encrypted with extra effort
by the scheduler and participants. However, in practice, email encryption is not widely adopted,
particular across organizational boundaries. A first step towards more secure meeting invites
would be to have a separate (ideally secure) communication channel for sharing meeting PINs. For
example, the UC platform could distribute PINs via SMS. However, SMS is not a secure channel
[5] and revealing phone numbers to the UC platform may constitute a privacy risk. Alternatively,
PINs could be shared manually via a secure IM channel, which is unlikely to be adopted due to the
additional overhead for meeting organizers and participants. Further work is therefore needed to
develop solutions for secure meeting invites that can be easily integrated into UC platforms.
Formal analysis. There are two directions in which the evaluation presented here could be enhanced
using formal and quantitative models. Firstly, the reference system, the relevant security and privacy
properties, and the commercial systems under study have all been described informally here. It
would be a worthwhile exercise to develop formal descriptions of the reference system and its
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properties, as has been done for other areas in privacy and security (e.g. electronic voting [27]).
This would allow formal proofs of any inter-dependencies between these, as well the development
of tool support for checking practical systems. Because most unified communication platforms are
closed-source, and all are of a high complexity, full formal verification of any platform against its
required properties is not realistic; however, a focused analysis of the core protocols used is more
realistic, as was done for Signal protocols [25]. The second dimension in which we could enhance
the analysis is through quantification. The current evaluation presents a qualitative assessment
of individual properties only. As a consequence, judgments on the platforms’ overall security
and privacy are largely missing. We include no verdict on the impact of any of the individual
privacy and security risks identified, and indeed these will strongly depend on the context of any
usage of unified communication. This will also strongly influence the likelihood of particular risks
materializing. The measurement of privacy risks in particular is a known challenging problem
[156], but a system that allows users to configure the identified risks with impacts and likelihoods,
and then combines the individual risk evaluations in some way, would be useful in selecting the
right platform for each use case.
Transparency and awareness. Users of UC platforms are often not aware what data these platforms
collect, store, and share, and they are also not aware of the potential consequences, for example,
following a data breach. Even though regulations such as the GDPR have introduced legal obligations
for companies to make collected data available to users, in practice this process is difficult to navigate
for users, and not all companies comply with their duties or the mandated timeframes [153].
Personal information feedback tools could help to improve user awareness regarding their
processed private data. However, more research is needed on the usability of these tools. In addition,
companies may be unlikely to provide their users with these tools unless mandated by laws or
regulations. As a result, a promising research direction could also be a client-side approach that
automates the entire process for the user, including requesting data from companies and presenting
the information in a usable manner [155].
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first comprehensive survey of privacy and security in unified commu-
nications. Based on a generic UC architecture, we systematically review possible security and
privacy threats, as well as possible existing mitigations, following the STRIDE and LINDDUN
methodologies. We then review the security and privacy features of ten existing UC platforms.
While most platforms provide many of the obvious security features, our survey has identified
that most platforms do not provide privacy properties, giving researchers and platform developers
opportunities for further work. In particular, there are significant challenges for anonymity and
undetectability, as well as challenges to enhance UC features such as meeting invitations with
security and privacy features.
The framework we have presented in this paper enables users to make informed decisions on the
selection of unified communication platforms, particularly with regard to their security and privacy
features. Unfortunately, users and organizations increasingly prefer to consume UC public cloud
services as a commodity without much regard to security and privacy. Ensuring that organizations
prioritize responsible security and privacy properties over the convenient use of cloud services is a
wider issue of socio-technical systems that also deserves further study.
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